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Are there points of similarity between the advise/guidelines offered in the Prince and Leading Quietly? Note how similarities will be used to enhance your leadership abilities.

To examine similarities between Machiavelli's *The Prince* and *Leading Quietly* by Badaracco, perhaps we are best served by first pointing out major differences - aside from the obvious difference of hundreds of years of time.

Machiavelli's attitude is "win at all costs," and he espouses the desire for acquisition for power as an essential and commendable part of human nature, "The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed..."

On the other hand Badaracco's attitude is "win without costing much," in that he feels that every action has a price to be considered before deciding a course of action. A 'political return on investment' so to speak which often leads to a coalition rather than complete control. "Crafting responsible workable compromises is not just something that quiet leaders do. It defines who they are. (Chapter 8)"

Despite the underlying fundamental differences, one similarity does run clearly through both discourses - that similarity is the emphasis of strategically planning each move deliberately and thoroughly.

We see examples of the importance of planning throughout both books. For example, aside from the bloodshed and motive, one sees parallels between the story of Rebecca Olson's quest to rid the hospital of a firmly entrenched employee and Machiavelli's recount of Severus deciding to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus.

In some ways, drawing such a comparison is uncomfortable due to the gross moral imbalance between mass bloodshed and murder and the firing of an employee who was likely in the wrong. For our purpose, we will view Machiavelli's blood-soaked examples as a reflection of his times, similar in

casting to the omnipresent "company attorneys" in the more contemporary *Leading Quietly*.

However, from the point of view of planning and preparation strategies purposes only, we can see that while Severus's planning is based in deceit and fueled by desire for power while Olson's planning is more controlled and less bold, both closely individuals followed planning patterns espoused by the authors.

A supporting similarity arises as both authors discuss fate and chance events as factors to consider, or react to, when planning.

As Machiavelli points out in a moment of near-cynicism, "Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions, but that she still leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less."

Badarocco agrees as he discusses two types of unknowns, both known and unknown. On the latter he notes, "These cannot be anticipated or planned for. They aren't on anyone's radar screen. They sneak up on people and make hash out of their well-laid plans." (Chapter one)

As both of these works emphasize advanced planning as central elements, perhaps one can compare them by viewing them as guidebooks of sorts for the two armies in Tolstoy's epic *War and Peace*. In this (somewhat fictionalized) account of Russian patience and valor ultimately defeating Napoleon's military might and cunning, we are presented examples of both Machiavelli and Badarocco's theories in action. Examining these author's guidelines against this "3rd party" backdrop provides additional insight about conflict resolution through planning which is elemental to successful management in contemporary times.

Badarocco's examples of patient maneuvering, harm reduction, and calculated risk are the same underlying philosophies utilized by the General of the Russian army. Indeed, as the aged General Kutuzof, in the moments of greatest despair, declares his decision to abandon Moscow to the Napoleon-led French forces, he is met with chagrin from the more eager factions who favor a more bold and aggressive course of action and "cannot imagine such a question."

While the General takes into account all manner of information gathered from the dispatches of officers in the field, he realizes both that the final decision is his to stand behind and opinions from nobles and officers are oft-colored with mixed motives such as career advancement, the pursuit of glory in battle, or protecting one's mortality or family.

Kutuzof also carefully surveyed his political capital knowing that many officers, nobles and perhaps even the King will disagree with him. He decides on the less-popular, patient choice at the risk of failure, knowing that with his advanced age and successful military campaign record, he didn't have much to lose and liberating Russia to gain.

Later, he reveals the core of his plan to Prince Andrei, telling him in a fatherly tone, "The strongest of all warriors (allies) are these two: Time and Patience." (War and Peace Book Ten: 1812. Chapter XVI)

Rather than acting in futile haste, Kutuzof is thinking not days, but months ahead, "several moves ahead on the chess board," to paraphrase Badarocco. While the Russians have fought well and won some battles, Kutuzof realizes that in trying to defend Moscow, he will lose not only Moscow but also the bulk of his troops.

Thus, he "buys some time" to re-examine the French weaknesses, particularly the tendencies of the French leader, gambling that his thirst for conquest will compel him on to Moscow where the harsh winter and lack of provisions will strip Napoleon's troop's resolve.

Additionally, by buying time with the retreat, Kuzutof gives the Russian army a chance to rest, strengthen and re-provision in the countryside and buys himself some time to swish each decision around in his mouth like a fine wine, savoring the complexities of each component before executing his moves. This strategy is in keeping with his feeling that, "When in doubt, my dear fellow, do nothing." (War and Peace Book Ten: 1812. Chapter XVI)

The other strategist in this panorama, Napoleon, seems to be carrying a copy of The Prince in his back pocket while conquering Europe. He would likely agree with Machiavelli

maxim, "For my part I consider that it is better to be adventurous than cautious..."

Further, he realizes that it is better to be feared than loved by his minions but at the same time, inspires them enough not to be hated. Indeed his reputation as a brilliant leader of high character is not lost on the Russians, many of whom admire him perhaps more than their own leaders, even frequently effecting French phrases and customs.

Machiavelli would likely comment favorably about this clever posturing by Napoleon, appearing noble, fair and even religious, all while having subordinates do his dirty work. While his minions marched scores of prisoners to their death of cold, starvation or execution, he nobly spares the life of a fallen Russian officer found still clutching a flag in the deserted, rotting battlefield.

The delegation of dirty work shown in this incident echoes Machiavelli's example of the Duke promoting Messer Ramiro d'Orco to minister, "a swift and cruel man, to whom he gave the fullest power." Later Ramiro is disposed of by his Duke to enhance his reputation with the people, "...so, to clear himself in the minds of the people, and gain them entirely to himself, he desired to show that, if any cruelty had been practiced, it had not originated with him, but in the natural sternness of the minister. Under this pretence he took Ramiro, and one morning caused him to be executed and left on the piazza..."

Over the course of his imperialistic expansion, Napoleon mastered many lessons about war. In fact, he was obsessed with the planning of campaigns, a worthy trait according to Machiavelli, who enthusiastically recounts, "Philopoemen, Prince of the Achaeans, among other praises which writers have bestowed on him, is commended because in time of peace he never had anything in his mind but the rules of war..."

Eventually Napoleon's lust for power and control clouded his thoughts, particularly in regards to human nature and resilience. The other significant planning flaw was underestimating the bitter cold of the Russian winter (paging Hitler, are you getting this?) and the use of troops from recently conquered lands that bore no loyalty, but rather resentment, towards him.

When Napoleon's hungry army arrived into Moscow, they lulled themselves into a state of complacency, feeling like they had succeeded in beating the Russians. Soon the troops began to get out of hand, looting and fighting amongst themselves as they became eager to get home to their lives in France or other Napoleonic colony from which they were forced from to fight. This discontent compiled with the cold and scarcity of provisions proved to be a catastrophic planning error.

While Badarocco and Machiavelli's processes and procedures vary greatly, like those of the armies in War and Peace, they both place the onus on planning, knowing your opponent and those alliances around you, all qualities needed in managing any organization, workgroup, or team.